The Priest and the Liturgy of the Word at Mass: Continuity Seen Between the Two Forms of the Roman Rite

ROME, FEB. 5, 2010 (Zenit.org).- In this article we will not be looking at the Liturgy of the Word in itself, about which we would have to provide an historical, theological and disciplinary panorama. In continuity with the preceding articles in this column, we will focus instead on the role of the priest in the Liturgy of the Word in the Mass, taking into account both the ordinary form (that of Paul VI) and the extraordinary form (that of St. Pius V) of the Roman Rite. [1]

The Extraordinary Form

In the "Low Mass" (a simple celebration for daily use) of the extraordinary form, the priest reads all the readings, that is, the Epistle [2], the Gradual and the Gospel. In general, he does this while assuming the same position that he does when he will later offer the holy sacrifice. Using a misleading but common expression, we might say that the priest proclaims the Liturgy of the Word "with his back to the people." The language of the proclamation is the same as the whole rite, that is, Latin, or sometimes the vernacular, as section 6 of the Motu Proprio "Summorum Pontificum" recalls.

After the Epistle is read there follows the Gradual, which receives its name from the steps (in Latin "gradus") that the deacon ascends to read the Gospel from the ambo in a solemn Mass. After the Gradual, the Alleluia is read with its verse. (The Tract, however, is substituted for the Alleluia during the period between Septuagesima Sunday and Easter and at Masses for the dead.)

On some occasions, before the Gospel, the priest also proclaims a "Sequentia." [3] Once this is done, while the server carries the Missal (which also contains the biblical readings) from the right side of the altar (called the "cornu epistuale") to the left side ("cornu evangelii"), the priest, who is standing at the center of the altar, asks for the Lord's benediction before passing to the left side (or northern side).

Having said "Dominus vobiscum" and having received the corresponding response, then having announced the title of the Gospel book from which he is about to read, and having traced the cross with his thumb upon the book and three times upon himself (over his forehead, lips and heart), he proclaims the Gospel from that side of the altar. When he reads the Epistle, the Gradual and the Alleluia, the priest rests his hands on the Missal or the altar, but always in such a way that his hands are touching the book. However, in proclaiming the Gospel, he folds his hands at chest-level.

After the Gospel is read, he lifts the book off the stand and kisses it, silently saying the formula "Per evangelica dicta, deleantur nostra delicta." During the proclamation of the different readings, the priests bows his head at every mention of the name of Jesus. In special circumstances a genuflection is made during the reading. At the end of the reading of the Gospel, those assisting the priest say "Laus tibi Christe."

After the Gospel, above all on Sundays and holy days of obligation, there can be, according to what is appropriate, a brief homily. [4] Finally, after the possible homily, the Symbol of Faith is recited when it is prescribed: the priest returns to the center of the altar and intones the "Credo," extending his arms and joining his hands again at the chest and bowing his head.

At the moment of the "Et incarnatus est" he genuflects and remains in this position until the "et homo factus est." He bows his head again at the "simul adoratur." Finally, concluding the "Creed," he makes the sign of the cross. All the parts of the Liturgy of the Word, except for the prayers that the priest recites before and after the proclamation of the Gospel, are said aloud.

Limitations of space prevent us from going into detail here about the way that the biblical readings are proclaimed at the solemn Mass.

The Ordinary Form

The Liturgy of the Word in the Missal of Paul VI kept different elements of the Missal of Pius V, even if others have been suppressed and some added. The language of the proclamation has not been changed since Latin has remained the proper language of the Roman liturgy even in the post-conciliar reform, the reason for which the new lectionaries (now printed in books separate from the Missal) were published in Latin in 1969 and 1981.

On the other hand, the "editio typica" has been translated into the various national languages and these translations are what are generally used. The "Institutio Generalis Missalis Romani," The General Instruction on the Roman Missal (GIRM) sets down the general norms of the Liturgy of the Word in sections 55-71.

A first difference between the two forms of the Roman Rite we see in the fact that, even in the daily Mass, celebrated in a non-solemn form, the possibility of other readers proclaiming the biblical passages -- except for the Gospel -- is foreseen [5], even if it remains possible for the priest to read all the texts of the Liturgy of the Word [6].

A second change is in the fact that, on Sundays and solemnities, there are three readings (first and second readings and the Gospel) besides the responsorial Psalm, which takes the place of the Gradual. The selection of biblical texts has also considerably increased in the ordinary form. [7]

A third element that is new is the reinsertion of the Prayer of the Faithful, which takes place after the Gospel and homily. The homily is recommended for every day of the year and is obligatory on Sundays and holy days of obligation. [8] It is significant that in the norms established by the GIRM there is a section on silence:

"The Liturgy of the Word is to be celebrated in such a way as to promote meditation, and so any sort of haste that hinders recollection must clearly be avoided. During the Liturgy of the Word, it is also appropriate to include brief periods of silence, accommodated to the gathered assembly, in which, at the prompting of the Holy Spirit, the word of God may be grasped by the heart and a response through prayer may be prepared. It may be appropriate to observe such periods of silence, for example, before the Liturgy of the Word itself begins, after the first and second reading, and lastly at the conclusion of the homily." [9]

The GIRM dictates that the biblical readings are always read from the ambo [10], so even when they are read by the priest, it is never done "with the back to the people." In the ordinary form too the priest recites a silent prayer before he proclaims the Gospel. In the rite of Paul VI, at the end of every reading a formula is said to which the faithful respond. [11]

The Psalm is called "responsorial" because a response is said by the faithful after each strophe. Even if it does not often happen, the norms allow for the singing or reciting of the Psalm without a response, or for it being substituted by a Gradual. [12]

The Missal of Paul VI continues the use of the "Sequentia" on some occasions. It is only obligatory on the days of Easter and Pentecost [13] and, furthermore, it is recited before the Alleluia verse rather than after.

The Gospel is proclaimed with the same gestures as those used in the Mass of Pius V although the GIRM does not specify where the priest should place his hands or similar things. [14] This is also the case for the recitation of the Creed, although the norms say that there is no genuflection but a bow of the head at the words "Et incarnatus est." [15]

In regard to the Prayer of the Faithful, the GIRM says that "[i]t is fitting that such a prayer be included, as a rule, in Masses celebrated with a congregation." [16] "It is for the priest celebrant to direct this prayer from the chair. He himself begins it with a brief introduction, by which he invites the faithful to pray, and likewise he concludes it with a prayer. [] The intentions are announced from the ambo or from another suitable place, by the deacon or by a cantor, a lector, or one of the lay faithful." [17]

Some Annotations

From what has been said, one sees the substantial continuity between the way of celebrating the Liturgy of the Word in the two Missals, unity and changes, some enriching, others more problematic. The continuity has different aspects. The first and principal is that the Liturgy of the Word of the Mass gathers into itself only biblical texts (Old and New Testament).

It is thus a denaturing of this part of the celebration to insert non-biblical texts, even if they are taken from the Fathers, from the great Doctors and Masters of Christian Spirituality. There is all the more reason then not to read from profane texts or the sacred writings of other religions. [18] The second aspect of continuity is the structure of the Liturgy of the Word, which is similar in the two forms of the Roman Rite.

There are also various aspects that are evidence of change. In the Rite of Paul VI the selection of biblical passages is much richer than in the older Missal. This fact is undoubtedly something positive and responds to the indications of "Sacrosanctum Concilium." [19] Nevertheless it would be appropriate to shorten many passages that are too long. [20]

The norm that specifies that the readings are proclaimed from the ambo and therefore that the readers face the people is also something positive. This position is also more suitable for the Liturgy of the Word. [21]

The norm that prescribes homilies as obligatory on Sundays and holy days of obligation is likewise beneficial. Here the priest has an important and delicate role. Recently, his excellency Monsignor Mariano Crociata, secretary general of the Italian bishops' conference, has observed that "it is decisive that the homilist is aware of being a listener himself, indeed of being the first hearer of the word that he pronounces. He must know that the word that he is about to speak to others is above all, if not only, addressed to him." [22]

The careful preparation of the homily is an integral part of the role of the priest in the Liturgy of the Word. Benedict XVI reminds us that the homily always has both a catechetical and exhortative purpose [23]: It cannot therefore be a lesson of biblical exegesis, because it must also express the dogma and because it must be a catechetical and not an academic discourse; nor can it only be a paraenesis that recalls certain vague values, perhaps taken from the current mentality without any evangelical filter (which would be a separation of the exhortative part, which regards the good to be done, from the catechetical part, which regards the truth believed).

With respect to the office of readers, the ordinary form permits that not only ministers expressly instituted by the Church for this task read but also other lay faithful. The priest's role, in this case, is no longer that of reading the biblical passages in first person, but that -- more distant -- of assuring that these readers are truly qualified. No one can just ascend to the ambo and proclaim the Word of God in the liturgy. If there are no persons who are adequately trained, the priest should continue to assume in first person the role of reader when truly qualified readers cannot be found.

Because of limitations of space, we cannot reflect here on the theme of the Prayer of the Faithful.

Finally, an element of change that represents an impoverishment is the lack of precise indications about the bodily dispositions that the priest should assume in the act of reading (especially the Gospel). Nevertheless, this represents a fundamental decision on the new Missal, which is much less precise than the older one about these aspects, leaving the field open to different celebrative attitudes.

One can remedy such a deficiency by applying the usages of the old rite to the new one, there where it is possible, though those indications that are not explicitly excluded by the current rubrics, such as folding one's hands at chest-level during the proclamation of the Gospel. That contributes to the dignity of the celebration of the Liturgy of the Word and can represent an example of the reciprocal influence between the two Missals hoped for by Benedict XVI, when he wrote that "the two forms of usage of the Roman Rite can mutually enrich each other."

In this way too "[t]he celebration of the Mass according to the Missal of Paul VI will be able to demonstrate, more powerfully than has been the case hitherto, the sacrality which attracts many people to the former usage." [24]

* * *

Notes

[1] For an historical panorama see, for example, M. Kunzler, "La liturgia della Chiesa," Jaca Book, Milano 2003 (2nd expanded edition), pp. 297-309, with a bibliography on pp. 309-310.

[2] In some cases the Epistle is preceded by other readings.

[3] In the Missal of John XXIII there are only 5 sequences: "Victimae paschali" for Easter, "Veni sancte Spiritus" for Pentecost, "Lauda Sion" for Corpus Christi, "Stabat Mater" for the 2 feasts of the Seven Sorrows, and "Dies Irae" for the Masses for the dead.

[4] "Post Evangelium, praesertim in dominicis et diebus festis de praecepto, hebeatur, iuxta opportunitatem, brevis homilia ad populum." "Missale Romanum," 1962, "Rubricae generales," VIII, no. 474.

[5] Liturgical reading is the role of the instituted lector (cf. GIRM, no. 99), nevertheless, "[i]n the absence of an instituted lector, other laypersons may be commissioned to proclaim the readings from Sacred Scripture. They should be truly suited to perform this function and should receive careful preparation, so that the faithful by listening to the readings from the sacred texts may develop in their hearts a warm and living love for Sacred Scripture" (GIRM, no. 101).

[6] Still, as the GIRM evinces (cf. no. 59), this second possibility is an option only in the absence of proper lectors. So also in no. 135: "If no lector is present, the priest himself proclaims all the readings and the Psalm, standing at the ambo." No. 176 prescribes that, if a deacon is present, he will be the one to read in the absence of a lector.

[7] There is no doubt about the greater wealth of biblical selections in the post-conciliar lectionary. One should recognize, nevertheless, that sometimes the passages are too long, which, together with the reinsertion of the Prayer of the Faithful and the ordinary practice of the homily, often makes the Liturgy of the Word longer than the Eucharistic Liturgy, giving place to a theological-liturgical imbalance and an imbalance in the ritual.

[8] Cf. GIRM, nos. 65-66. Unlike the norms set down in the 1962 Missal, the GIRM does not specify that the homily must be "brief."

[9] GIRM, n. 56.

[10] Cf. GIRM, no. 58.

[11] Cf. GIRM, no. 128.

[12] Cf. GIRM, no. 61.

[13] Cf. GIRM, no. 64.

[14] Cf. GIRM, no. 134.

[15] The genuflection is only retained for the Annunciation and for Christmas (cf. GIRM, no. 137).

[16] GIRM, no. 69.

[17] GIRM, no. 71.

[18] "It is also illicit to omit or to substitute the prescribed biblical readings on one's own initiative, and especially "to substitute other, non-biblical texts for the readings and responsorial Psalm, which contain the word of God." (Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, "Redemptionis Sacramentum," no. 62).

[19] "In sacred celebrations there is to be more reading from Holy Scripture, and it is to be more varied and suitable." (Vatican Council II, "Sacrosanctum Concilium," no. 35).

[20] Other defects in the post-conciliar lectionary are noted by A. Nocent in "Scientia liturgica. Manuale di liturgia, III: L'Eucaristia," Piemme, Casale Monferrato, 2003 (3rd ed.), pp. 195-200.

[21] Cf. J. Ratzinger, "Introduzione allo spirito della liturgia," San Paolo, Cinisello Balsamo, 2001, p. 77.

[22] M. Crociata, Homily for the Mass of the Liturgical Conference for Seminarians, Rome, December 29, 2009: http://www.chiesacattolica.it/cci2009/segretario/chiesa_cattolica_italiana/cei/00009347_Roma__S.E._Mons.Crociata_al_Convegno_liturgico.html

[23] Cf. Benedict XVI, "Sacramentum Caritatis," no. 46.

[24] Benedict XVI, Letter to the Bishops on the occasion of the Motu Proprio "Summorum Pontificum."

[Translation by Joseph G. Trabbic]

Wednesday Liturgy: After a Church Is Attacked

ROME, FEB. 2, 2010 (Zenit.org).- Answered by Legionary of Christ Father Edward McNamara, professor of liturgy at the Regina Apostolorum university.


Q: There was a bomb blast last year in our cathedral at Kathmandu. In it, three people died and several were injured. In all probability, one died on the spot (inside the church). We did clean up the place after the police had done their job, and we had Mass celebrated the following day. Now, there was doubt in the minds of some of our old Catholics. At least one of them told me that after a murder takes place in the church, it is desecrated (because of the murder); therefore, before celebrating Mass and other sacraments in the building, the church needs to be re-dedicated. The person told me that that was "the rule before." I personally had not come across a situation like this before, and I did not know whether any rule existed either. Could you please explain whether there are some rules or regulations with regard to this? -- P.P., Kathmandu, Nepal

A: This topic is dealt with in the Code of Canon Law and in the Ceremonial of Bishops. Canons 1211-1112 touch upon the violation of sacred places.

"Can. 1211 Sacred places are violated by gravely injurious actions done in them with scandal to the faithful, actions which, in the judgment of the local ordinary, are so grave and contrary to the holiness of the place that it is not permitted to carry on worship in them until the damage is repaired by a penitential rite according to the norm of the liturgical books.

"Can. 1212 Sacred places lose their dedication or blessing if they have been destroyed in large part, or have been turned over permanently to profane use by decree of the competent ordinary or in fact."

To this must be added the norms of the Ceremonial of Bishops, Nos. 1070-1092, which describes the public prayers to be made after the desecration of a church.

First, it specifies further the nature of the crimes that can desecrate a church as those that "do grave dishonor to sacred mysteries, especially to the eucharistic species, and are committed to show contempt for the Church, or are crimes that are serious offenses against the dignity of the person and society."

It continues: "A church, therefore, is desecrated by actions that are gravely injurious in themselves and a cause of scandal to the faithful."

The situation in Kathmandu clearly fulfills all the conditions for a desecration.

Reparation for the desecration is to be carried out with a penitential rite celebrated as soon as possible. Until that time, no sacred rite may be celebrated in the church. Preaching to prepare for the penitential rite may be carried out. The people are encouraged to avail themselves of the sacrament of reconciliation, which should be celebrated in another church. To symbolize penance, the Ceremonial recommends: "The altar of the church should be stripped bare and all customary signs of joy and gladness should be put away, for example, lights flowers, and other such articles."

It is fitting that the bishop presides at the rite of reparation, which may be either a celebration of the Eucharist or a Liturgy of the Word as circumstances suggest. It may be celebrated on any day except the Easter triduum, Sundays and solemnities, but may be celebrated on the vigil of a Sunday. The Mass of reparation is the preferred mode.

The most suitable Mass formula may be chosen; for example: the votive Mass of the holy Eucharist (in cases of profanation of the Blessed Sacrament) or for promoting harmony in the case of violent clashes.

There are several forms of carrying out the rite. One is a procession of the people from a nearby church or another suitable place during which prayer and the litany of the saints is sung, including the patron of the desecrated church and other prayers found in the Roman ritual. If a procession is not possible, then the people gather in the church and the bishop and other ministers enter from the sacristy.

On entering the church, the bishop along with concelebrants and other ministers goes to the chair without reverencing the altar. He then blesses water, and after a moment of silent prayer sprinkles the altar. He may also sprinkle the people and the walls. Returning to the chair, and with hands joined, he invites those present to pray. After a brief silent prayer, the bishop recites the opening prayer with hands outstretched.

The readings usually come from the Mass for the forgiveness of sins, unless other more suitable readings are chosen. Appropriate general intercessions are prayed only if the litany of the saints has not been used. After this, the deacon and other ministers place the altar cloth and the other usual elements upon the altar and may place flowers around it. The procession of the gifts follows the bishop receiving them at the chair.

When everything is ready, the bishop goes to the altar and kisses it and the Mass continues in the usual manner.

In the case of desecration of the Eucharist, the concluding rites of Mass are replaced by exposition, adoration and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament.

If there is only a celebration of the Word, then everything is done as above, until after the homily. A prayer of intercession asking for God's mercy is carried out. The altar is then dressed and decorated by the ministers or the faithful. The bishop then approaches the altar, and kisses and incenses it. He subsequently introduces the Our Father, followed by a suitable closing prayer and the blessing.

When the Ceremonial of Bishops was published, the official rite of reparation was not yet promulgated. However, the elements provided in the Ceremonial and described above suffice for the preparation of an adequate celebration.

Wednesday Liturgy: Follow-up: Adoration Without Exposition

ROME, FEB. 2, 2010 (Zenit.org).- Answered by Legionary of Christ Father Edward McNamara, professor of liturgy at the Regina Apostolorum university.


Pursuant to our commentaries on adoration without exposition (Jan. 19), a reader from Columbus, Ohio, outlined this case: "I know of a situation where a priest goes to the tabernacle and brings the Blessed Sacrament to the altar and places it in the monstrance before the students of the school come to the church for Benediction. Only one person is present in the church while the priest leaves and comes back to the church later for Benediction. When the liturgy of Benediction begins, the Blessed Sacrament is already displayed on the altar. Also, should the priest presiding at Benediction leave the sanctuary and go to the confessional to hear confessions while the Blessed Sacrament is exposed?"

While the procedure described is perhaps imperfect, it is not, strictly speaking, contrary to the liturgical law with respect to a simple exposition. The presence of at least one person at all times is necessary for exposition, so this rule appears to be fulfilled.

There is also a specific rule that the Blessed Sacrament may not be exposed just to impart Benediction. Thus, if the students arrive only for Benediction, then it is correct that they should find the Blessed Sacrament already exposed and somebody in adoration.

Preferably, though, the best procedure would be to await the arrival of the students, expose the sacrament with song, have about 20 minutes of adoration and then give Benediction.

Regarding the second question, since exposition and Benediction are two separate liturgical acts, there is no difficulty, and may even be commendable, for a priest to hear confessions while the faithful are engaged in adoration.

A Chicago priest had asked earlier: "Is it ever proper or permissible to have exposition and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament right before the celebration of Mass on the same altar and in the same church?"

Again, it would be incorrect to expose the Blessed Sacrament only to give Benediction, but the norms foresee the possibility of longer periods of adoration on the same altar upon which Mass is celebrated.

If the exposition ends before the Mass, then Benediction may be given before the celebration but as separate celebrations. This means that after Benediction the priest and other ministers should return to the sacristy, change to appropriate Mass vestments, and form a new procession.

If adoration is to continue after Mass, then the Blessed Sacrament may be simply reserved before Mass and restored after it is over. However, this should not be done more than twice in one day.

Article: Stem Cell Ethics and the Things We Refuse to Do…

FATHER TADEUSZ PACHOLCZYK

In arguing for ethical science, those of us working to safeguard human life would do well to examine our premises carefully, so as to avoid weak or questionable assumptions that could undermine the thrust of our arguments.

Many well-intentioned pro-lifers have inadvertently adopted flawed or incomplete arguments while trying to defend the noblest of causes: the plight of the vulnerable and the unborn. In the debate over stem cells, for example, a common argument runs like this:

Human embryonic stem cell research is wrong because we are witnessing new medical treatments for sick patients exclusively with adult, not embryonic stem cells. Every disease that has been successfully treated thus far with stem cells has relied on adult stem cells, while embryonic stem cells haven't produced any cures yet. Adult stem cells work, while embryonic don't, and it's basically a waste of resources to pursue something that is not working. Therefore scientists should stop beating their drums about human embryonic stem cells since all the real-life treatments for patients are occurring exclusively with adult stem cells

This argument, often employed by those of a pro-life persuasion, is flawed on a number of counts.

First, it seems to presume that the only yardstick for determining embryonic stem cell "success" will be in terms of benefits to patients who are struggling with various ailments and diseases. Yet researchers themselves would argue that there are many other reasons to pursue embryonic stem cell research. For example, such research is sure to be valuable for gaining further insight into the cellular mechanisms underlying the development of an organism and is already providing important clues about how an animal builds itself up from a single starting cell called the zygote. Scientific research using non-human (e.g. mouse, rat, or monkey) embryonic stem cells can address these kinds of questions in a responsible way and clearly deserves to be funded and promoted. Such non-human embryonic stem cell research is, in fact, a praiseworthy and ethically uncontentious kind of scientific investigation.

Second, the argument that adult stem cells are helping sick patients while embryonic are not -- and thus the adult stem cells are "more ethical" -- seems to reduce the stem cell ethics debate to a discussion about what works best, or what is most effective. In fact, however, the ethical concerns have very little to do with scientific efficiency and everything to do with the fact that researchers violate and destroy young humans (who are still embryos) in order to acquire their stem cells.

Furthermore, it may be strictly a matter of time before the embryonic stem cells begin providing cures for human patients. At any point in the future, we could be greeted by a front page news story announcing a dramatic "success," perhaps an embryonic stem cell transplant allowing childhood diabetics to give up their insulin injections or paralyzed patients to walk. That "success," however, would not change the ethical objections to embryo destruction or make an evil act a morally acceptable one -- though it might increase the temptation for some to cross the objective ethical line.

Bioethicist Paul Ramsey put it well in suggesting that any man of serious conscience, when discussing ethics, will have to conclude that, “there may be some things that men should never do. The good things that men do can be made complete only by the things they refuse to do."

To put it more simply: even if it were possible to cure all diseases known to mankind by harvesting (and therefore killing) a single human embryo, it would never become ethical to do so. We cannot choose evil that good might come, nor can we ever afford to pay the steep ethical price of ignoring the sacrosanct humanity of the embryo, that tiny creature that each of us once was ourselves. Treating a fellow human being, albeit a very small one, as a means rather than an end, violates his or her most basic human rights.

In fact, the direct killing of other humans, whether young and embryonic or old and in their dotage, is properly referred to as an intrinsic evil, meaning it is in every instance wrong, and ought never be chosen as a human act. Intrinsic evils do not admit of any legitimate exceptions. Once we concretely recognize the immoral character of an action prohibited by an exceptionless norm, the only ethically acceptable act is to follow the requirements of the moral law and turn away from the action which it forbids.

Bioethicist Paul Ramsey put it well in suggesting that any man of serious conscience, when discussing ethics, will have to conclude that, "there may be some things that men should never do. The good things that men do can be made complete only by the things they refuse to do."

Refusing to destroy human embryos as a scientist does not imply any opposition to science itself, but only to unethical science, which, like unethical investment practices or unethical medicine, is invariably harmful to society. Good science is necessarily ethical science; it cannot ever be reduced merely to "efficient" science, that which might work or "solve my problems" at the expense of others. In arguing for ethical science, those of us working to safeguard human life would do well to examine our premises carefully, so as to avoid weak or questionable assumptions that could undermine the thrust of our arguments.

---

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Rev. Tadeusz Pacholczyk. "Stem Cell Ethics and the Things We Refuse to Do…" Making Sense Out of Bioethics (December, 2009).

Father Tad Pacholczyk writes a monthly column, Making Sense out of Bioethics, which appears in various diocesan newspapers across the country. This article is reprinted with permission of the author, Rev. Tadeusz Pacholczyk, Ph.D.

The National Catholic Bioethics Center (NCBC) has a long history of addressing ethical issues in the life sciences and medicine. Established in 1972, the Center is engaged in education, research, consultation, and publishing to promote and safeguard the dignity of the human person in health care and the life sciences. The Center is unique among bioethics organizations in that its message derives from the official teaching of the Catholic Church: drawing on the unique Catholic moral tradition that acknowledges the unity of faith and reason and builds on the solid foundation of natural law.

The Center publishes two journals (Ethics & Medics and The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly) and at least one book annually on issues such as physician-assisted suicide, abortion, cloning, and embryonic stem cell research. Educational programs include the National Catholic Certification Program in Health Care Ethics and a variety of seminars and other events.

Inspired by the harmony of faith and reason, the Quarterly unites faith in Christ to reasoned and rigorous reflection upon the findings of the empirical and experimental sciences. While the Quarterly is committed to publishing material that is consonant with the magisterium of the Catholic Church, it remains open to other faiths and to secular viewpoints in the spirit of informed dialogue.

THE AUTHOR

Rev. Tadeusz Pacholczyk, Ph.D. earned his doctorate in neuroscience from Yale and did post-doctoral work at Harvard. He is a priest of the diocese of Fall River, MA, and serves as the Director of Education at The National Catholic Bioethics Center in Philadelphia. See www.ncbcenter.org. Father Tadeusz Pacholczyk is a member of the advisory board of the Catholic Education Resource Center.

Copyright © 2009 Rev. Tadeusz Pacholczyk, Ph.D.

Article: Our Vanishing Ultimate Resource

STEVEN MALANGA

Plummeting birthrates threaten prosperity worldwide. Can America buck the trend?

In Kamikatsu, on the Japanese island of Shikoku, officials have set up an agricultural cooperative whose members log on to computers daily to check the fluctuating prices of the produce that they grow. Then they go out and pick whatever is fetching the best price that day. Unusual, yes, but what's truly surprising about this cooperative is the average age of its members: 70. In a country where lots of folks retire at 60, Kamikatsu's residents are working well into their senior years—and they're doing so not only to buoy retirement earnings but also to energize the local economy. With nearly half of the town's residents 65 and older, the government realized that there simply wasn't enough of a traditional workforce available to build or staff most typical industries.

Kamikatsu shows in microcosm what Japan and several other nations now face—and what others soon will. For decades, demographers and economists have watched the world's fertility rate plunge as countries grew wealthier and more urban. These days, fertility rates in much of the industrialized world are far below replacement levels—that is, the number of kids that parents must have to replace themselves and adults who remain childless. Though the steepest declines happened first in wealthy countries like Japan, Italy, Germany, and Spain, even many developing countries have seen their fertility rates head downward.

The demographic shift brings extraordinary new challenges. Economists are increasingly recognizing that the struggles of places like Japan and Italy to extricate themselves from economic slumps that began in the 1990s result in part from extreme "birth dearths" that have shrunk labor pools, dried up consumer spending, and made businesses, staffed by older employees, more risk-averse. Decades of government efforts to reverse birth dearth have largely proved fruitless.

Yet one industrialized country resists the trend: America. True, the American fertility rate has also fallen in recent decades. But it has surged of late and now stands at population-replacement level, about 2.07 children per woman. That reality has led to projections of vigorous U.S. economic growth in the next half-century. What's behind the relative fecundity? A good guess is American-style free-market capitalism, which (despite recent economic woes) encourages long-term optimism, taxes less of parents' income, and affords them easier mobility into and out of the job market than they'd find in more regulated economies.

News of a population bust might come as a surprise to many Americans. More than two centuries after English scholar Thomas Malthus argued that population growth exceeded the earth's ability to feed us—"The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man," he wrote—the media continue to warn us about impending environmental catastrophe and mass starvation caused by an exploding human population. These Malthusian alarms persist even though the last 200 years have proved Malthus completely wrong. As the world's population shot up, starting around the time of the Industrial Revolution, worldwide standards of living rose in tandem. People proved far more resourceful in expanding food production, tapping new veins of natural resources, and inventing technologies to accommodate a growing population than Malthus dreamed possible. When mass deprivation has occurred in modern times, it has invariably resulted from political tyranny and social chaos, not from an inability to derive enough resources from the earth.

Today, women in more than 60 countries, ranging from Austria, Canada, and Poland to Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, don't bear enough children to keep the population growing. In a handful of countries, women average just one child over a lifetime, less than half the replacement rate.

Even as modern societies became more productive, something else happened that contemporary Malthusians have ignored: fertility rates began declining. In England, the number fell from an average of nearly six children per woman in 1775 to 3.35 in 1875 to 1.96 today. In Germany, the rate slumped from more than five children per woman in 1850 (earlier data aren't available) to 1.4 today; in Italy, from nearly five children in 1850 to 1.3 today.

The trend long went unnoticed because rising life expectancy kept populations expanding. But by the 1960s and 1970s, more and more countries started seeing their birthrates sink beneath replacement levels. Today, women in more than 60 countries, ranging from Austria, Canada, and Poland to Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, don't bear enough children to keep the population growing. In a handful of countries, women average just one child over a lifetime, less than half the replacement rate. The fertility drop in many less developed countries hasn't dipped below replacement levels yet, but it's heading there fast. Over the last few decades, Mexico's rate went from nearly seven children per woman to 2.3; Egypt's, from just under seven to 2.72; and India's, from nearly six to about 2.7.

What's behind the dwindling births? The chief factor is urbanization. Starting in the Industrial Revolution, households began migrating from rural areas, where Johnny and Sally could work on the family farm to help make ends meet, to cities, where the modern economy made kids a financial burden, requiring them to spend more and more years in school to become employable. Nowadays, it costs between $170,000 and $300,000 to raise a child through high school in the United States or Europe. And as urbanization has proceeded rapidly in many less developed countries—some 50 percent of the world's population now live in cities—fertility rates are collapsing everywhere. Also putting downward pressure on fertility rates is women's desire to work, which has delayed childbearing and thus narrowed their "fertility window."

The resulting population dive will be breathtaking. Japan's population, projections say, will decline by about 21 percent over the next four decades. South Korea's population, which swelled by two-thirds over the last 40 years, is estimated to shrink by nearly 10 percent in the next 40. Europe's population will peak in about five years and contract by between 6 and 16 percent by 2050, led by big declines in Germany (down 14 percent), Italy (6 percent), Poland (16 percent), and Russia (22 percent).

Plunging birthrates will significantly slow population growth in many less developed countries as well. Mexico, which more than doubled, to 110 million people, over the last 40 years, could see flat population growth in the next 40. Thailand's population, which has grown by two-thirds since 1970, will probably increase by no more than 6 percent by 2050.

Demographers are scrambling to adjust their population projections, with little notice in the press. In the early 1990s, United Nations researchers projected that the world's population would reach a maximum of 10 to 12 billion people (up from about 6.7 billion today). They subsequently scaled back that projection to 9.5 billion and then to about 9.1—adding, however, that it might be as low as 7.9. But the truth is that no one knows how this massive reversal will end. The UN demographers optimistically claim that the world's fertility rate, currently at 2.6 children per woman, will decline to replacement level and then stabilize. But there's no clear reason for that to happen; dozens of countries have seen their rates sink far lower. In his book Fewer, Ben Wattenberg estimates that if the rate were to stop at 1.85 births per woman, the world's population could shrink to 2.3 billion by the year 2300.

Shrinking fertility rates are producing rapidly graying societies. More than 20 percent of Japan's population, for instance, is now 65 or older, and by 2050, that figure will rise to an astonishing 40 percent. Germany's over-65 population has increased from 15 percent in 1980 to 20 percent today and is expected to reach one-third of the population by 2050. The less developed countries are again following the pattern. China's 65-and-over population will rise from 8 percent today to nearly a quarter of the country by 2050. Mexico's will increase from 7 percent to 22 percent. In fact, say demographers, we're seeing something unprecedented in less developed countries: populations getting old before they get rich. Places like Iran and North Korea, where fertility rates have nose-dived below replacement levels, are aging even before they develop modern institutions to participate in the global economy.

Since economic growth depends strongly on an expanding population—something poorly understood until recently—aging countries' economies face serious problems. As late as the 1960s, Malthus-influenced neoclassical economists believed that population growth reduced a society's standard of living by dividing up the same "pie" into smaller and smaller slices. Economists have gradually come to understand, however, that in industrialized countries, population growth spurs productivity growth. This is partly because economies of scale and specialization of labor boost output per worker. Studies have found that an industrialized country whose population doubles can expect per-worker output to increase by 20 percent. Fertility decline may initially boost economic performance in less developed countries because having fewer children frees up resources, but over time, the effects of a shrinking population will prevail everywhere.

Further, economists have recognized that what's essential to wealth creation is human creativity, not natural resources. Famously disputing the neo-Malthusian warnings of Paul Ehrlich, author of the 1968 bestseller The Population Bomb, economist Julian Simon called people the "ultimate resource." Human beings, he observed, discovered how to convert oil, coal, and uranium, which had sat worthless in the earth for eons, into energy. "The most important economic effect of population size is the contribution of additional people to our stock of useful knowledge," Simon noted. A growing population streams young workers into the labor market, and they are usually the most daring, entrepreneurial, and even knowledgeable and inventive (successive generations of workers in industrial countries have typically been more educated than their predecessors). "Those who fear overpopulation share a simple insight: People use resources," Harvard economist Greg Mankiw wrote in 1998, summing up the argument. "The rebuttal to this argument is equally simple: People create resources."

Japan shows what happens when a country begins losing its ultimate resource. The country's economic misfortunes, which began in the early 1990s after decades of post–World War II growth and have persisted with little relief, often get blamed on the bursting of the country's real-estate bubble, government support of banks laden with bad loans, and a highly regulated and uncompetitive domestic economy. But as years went by and the Japanese economy failed to cycle out of its downturn, observers gradually realized that something even deeper afflicted it: not enough people. Japan was stuck in "the world's first low-birth recession," in the words of sociologist Yamada Masahiro.

"Those who fear overpopulation share a simple insight: People use resources," Harvard economist Greg Mankiw wrote in 1998, summing up the argument. "The rebuttal to this argument is equally simple: People create resources."

The size of Japan's workforce population peaked in the mid-1990s; since then, it has been shrinking—and aging. At Matsushita Electric Industrial, now Panasonic, for example, the age of an average worker increased from 31 in 1980 to 41 in 2002. This graying has caused a significant slump in Japan's once-vaunted productivity. Older workers' experience can be valuable, but they tend to be less productive than their younger counterparts because they generally work fewer hours, are more costly to employ (since their seniority-based wages are higher), and aren't as adaptable or as up-to-date technologically. Japanese productivity (as measured by worker output per hour), once the envy of the industrialized world, is now just 70 percent of America's and below the average of the 32 countries that make up the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

As aging Japanese workers poured ever more of their earnings into retirement accounts, consumer spending suffered, too. Between 1990 and 2000, average Japanese household spending actually shrank, once adjusted for inflation. While savings can lift an economy by providing more capital for business investment, Japanese producers viewed the increasing savings and the falling consumption as a sign of population stagnation, and they stopped investing at home, instead expanding in overseas markets like the U.S.

Japan's economic doldrums seem semipermanent. Japan's economy grew by a paltry 10 percent in the 1990s, or less than 1 percent a year, after averaging inflation-adjusted gains of 40 to 50 percent per decade during the 1970s and 1980s. After a brief growth spurt from 2004 through 2007, Japan's economy has again contracted, is smaller today than it was a decade ago, and "will contract in size from now on," Japanese economist Akihiko Matsutani predicts.

Italy is another country where a rapidly falling birthrate has helped undermine prosperity. Like most industrialized countries, Italy enjoyed a brief postwar baby boom, with its population increasing by 15 percent from 1950 to 1970. Despite occasional political turmoil and the stereotype of Italians as desultory workers, the economy ignited in the mid-1970s, just as the first members of this baby boom were entering their adult years, and grew fourfold between 1975 and 1990. In 1987, the country celebrated the sorpasso, its economy's surpassing of the United Kingdom's in size. But the celebration was short-lived, for the early 1970s were also the beginning of a steep and persistent drop in the Italian fertility rate, which declined by 50 percent in just 20 years, to 1.2 births per woman by 1990.

Not coincidentally, the nineties saw Italy fall into a long economic funk. The birth dearth cut into Italy's working-age population, and severe labor shortages ensued. When Franco Tosi, a manufacturing company, tried opening an auto-parts operation in Legnano in northern Italy in 2001, it couldn't find enough workers to staff the 1,500-person effort, even though the economy had been drifting for several years, and huge crates of supplies sat unopened. Italian officials estimated that the country faced a labor shortage of 100,000 to 160,000 workers throughout its northern industrial region.

A social-security crisis also looms, presaging similar problems in other industrialized countries. A full 22 percent of Italy's population is now on a pension, one of the highest rates in the world, and the country devotes 15 percent of its gross domestic product to pensions—more than any European nation. Retirement not only robs the workforce of needed laborers but also depresses household consumption because retirees almost invariably spend less than workers do. In Italy, the average adult 35 or younger spends the equivalent of $2,813 per month on living expenses; an adult 65 or older spends only $1,924. The situation will only worsen: by 2020, Italy will have just two working adults for every retiree.

The economic impact of fertility decline is most noticeable in Japan and Italy, but other countries are feeling it, too. Sweden was one of the first wealthy nations to see births fall below replacement level, where they've stayed for four decades except for a brief resurgence in the early nineties. As Sweden's population has aged—18 percent of Swedes today are over 65 and retired, compared with 14 percent in 1970—the country's economic performance has languished, with its once-formidable growth rate falling well below the OECD average over the last two decades. Entrepreneurialism—which is highest among workers aged 25 to 34, studies show—has especially suffered: only one of Sweden's 50 largest companies was created after 1970; the country now has the lowest self-employment rate in the OECD; and the number of entrepreneurs has declined by almost 9 percent since 1995, notes Johan Norberg, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

Faced with the inescapable math of fertility decline, many countries have tried to address its economic consequences. The most common policy change has been to reduce the size of the welfare state, especially through adjustments to pension systems, which aren't sustainable as the ratio of workers to pensioners declines. The European trend until recently was for workers to retire earlier and earlier, even as life expectancy grew. The labor-force participation rate of people aged 55 to 64 in the European Union is just 48 percent, compared with 64 percent in the United States. Countries with some of the gravest population problems also have the lowest rates of participation. In Italy, for instance, only 36 percent of 55- to 64-year-olds are in the labor force.

Austria, France, Germany, and Italy are among the countries that have already pushed back their average retirement ages and cut benefits for early retirees. Sweden has gone further, revamping its pension system to resemble the partly privatized Chilean model, which bases a worker's retirement income on the contributions he makes to his pension account over a lifetime. French and Italian workers initially fought some of these changes but eventually accepted them: the reality of fertility decline and aging populations has become unavoidable in Europe. Demographer Paul Hewitt has even argued that it heralds "the end of the postwar welfare state."

Unfortunately, getting people to work longer won't solve countries' fertility-related economic difficulties, even if it will have a modest impact on pension spending. The Japanese, for instance, already boast a nearly 70 percent labor-force participation rate for those aged 55 to 64. But because of the country's extreme birth dearth, by mid-century the average Japanese would need to work until age 83 to keep a constant ratio of workers to retirees. Europeans would need to work until their late seventies.

That's why some nations have also sought to lift fertility levels through natalist policies. After France's population stopped growing in the 1930s, the country introduced the first such program—regional associations that promoted traditional family values—and the Vichy government kept the effort going, even under Nazi occupation. The worldwide fertility decline that began in the 1970s sparked new natalist experiments. Sweden introduced paid parental leave of one year in 1980 and then extended it to 15 months in 1989. Austria offered yearlong maternal leave, paying a woman up to 40 percent of her working earnings. Other governments have tried tax credits and even direct payments to parents.

At best, these policies have had only a short-term, marginal effect on fertility rates. Sweden's fertility rate bounced back after the country introduced its aggressive natalist policies, rising from 1.65 in 1984 to 2.1 in 1991. But the rate then slumped rapidly, falling to 1.5 by the decade's end. Norway, which introduced similar policies, saw its fertility rate stay almost flat over a 20-year period. Austria's rate never rose in response to its policies and currently hovers at 1.4. The problem, many observers believe, is that countries can't afford to offer sufficient benefits to get families to have more babies. "One might say that $1,000 a year is not anywhere near enough to raise a child," writes Wattenberg. "How about $10,000? Or a million dollars?

Sooner or later it would work; too bad there is not that kind of money around."

A social-security crisis also looms, presaging similar problems in other industrialized countries. A full 22 percent of Italy's population is now on a pension, one of the highest rates in the world, and the country devotes 15 percent of its gross domestic product to pensions—more than any European nation.

Increased immigration doesn't seem to be the answer. For starters, immigration has a very small impact on long-term population trends, even in countries with relatively high levels of migration. In a recent National Bureau of Economic Research study, four economists estimated that immigration over the last 40 years in Austria, whose population is 10 percent foreign-born, has added less than 1 percentage point to the share of the population that is working-age. Many immigrants, it turns out, quickly adopt the fertility patterns of their new country.

There are exceptions, such as France, where North African Muslim immigrants have retained high fertility rates. A study of birthrates among the French in the 1990s found that immigrant women from Morocco, Tunisia, and other North African countries had a fertility rate of nearly three. But the unemployment rate among the foreign-born in France is twice the rate of native-born French (by contrast, in the U.S. the foreign-born unemployment rate is roughly the same as the native-born rate). Nor have the children of the foreign-born in France proved successful at integrating into the French economy. In many North African neighborhoods in France, 30 to 40 percent of 15- to 24-year-olds are unemployed.

Seeking solutions, a few policy experts have begun looking more closely at the United States. After a big drop in the mid-1970s, America's fertility rate bounced back and has remained relatively stable, near replacement level—a 30-year-plus pattern that astounds European observers. For a time, demographers explained the difference between the U.S. and other industrialized countries by observing that America's population was more diverse, with more recent immigrants who had more children. But fertility levels among native-born white Americans also remain higher than among native-born Europeans, and the U.S.'s overall fertility outpaces that of other countries with a high percentage of foreign-born residents.

Demographers have also speculated that the higher fertility rate is a function of America's being a more religious country, reasoning that those who engage in organized religious activity favor larger families. One survey found 46 percent of Americans attending religious services regularly, compared with just 4 percent of Japanese, 7 percent of Swedes, and 16 percent of Germans. Yet fertility rates have remained stable in the U.S. even as they have plummeted in religious fundamentalist countries like Iran and Jordan, as well as in developing countries like Mexico, where rates of religious attendance remain higher than in America.

Faced with these contradictions, some scholars are now positing the distinctive nature of the U.S. economy and its labor market as a principal reason why Americans are having so many kids. "In general, women (and couples) are deterred from having children when the economic cost—in the form of lower lifetime wages—is too high," wrote economists Francesco Billari, José Antonio Ortega, and Hans-Peter Kohler in a 2006 study. "Compared to other high-income countries, this cost is diminished by an American labor market that allows more flexible work hours and makes it easier to leave and then reenter the labor force."

In Japan and many European countries with low fertility rates, government policies and cultural pressures on businesses make it difficult and expensive to lay off workers, instead promoting virtual guarantees of lifetime employment and early retirement. That, in turn, makes it harder to rehire those who have taken a break from work. Women are left with a difficult choice: either work full-time continuously and remain childless, or take time off to raise children and derail future employment opportunities. In Japan, 70 percent of women who leave the workforce to have a child never return. In low-fertility countries like Italy, Spain, and Greece, 40 to 50 percent of women are no longer working by 50. Over 70 percent of American women are still in the workforce at that age. In America, employers and workers have also proved far more innovative in designing work schemes that afford parents better reentry into the job market, including flex-time arrangements. One study found that in over 30 percent of families in America in which both parents work, one parent is not working the traditional nine-to-five schedule.

Some countries have tried to compensate for rigid labor markets by enforcing parental-leave policies that require companies to rehire mothers (and occasionally fathers) who've taken time off to have a child and by providing parents with state-subsidized child care when their leave expires. But while such policies do encourage women to work, they're enormously expensive and hurt economic growth. Norway spends an astonishing 2.7 percent of its gross domestic product on subsidized day care. Partly as a result, Norway and other Northern European countries with aggressive natalist policies are among the most heavily taxed in the developed world. Levies on the average worker amount to 44 percent of earnings in Norway and 48 percent in Sweden, compared with 29 percent in America. And high taxes put downward pressure on fertility by diminishing the disposable earnings that couples might choose to spend on child rearing. One study of Europe's plush pension systems, which require payroll taxes of up to 20 percent of earnings in some countries, found that the most expensive plans have probably diminished fertility rates by up to 1.6 children per couple.

The result of these disparities is a dramatically different demographic and economic future for the U.S. than for the rest of the industrialized world. While other developed countries shrink and age, America's population will grow by one-third through 2050, projections say. The working-age population in America will expand by some 45 million people even as it contracts by 100 million people in Europe and by 10 million in Japan. The economic boon to the U.S. could be significant: population growth has accounted for one-half to two-thirds of annual GDP growth in the industrialized world since World War II, according to Hewitt. By contrast, a shrinking population will cut Japanese and European economic growth by an average of nearly 1 percent annually by 2020, economists estimate. Shifting demographic patterns could also sharpen the American edge in innovation and entrepreneurship, as the pools of highly educated workers shrink in Europe and Japan and population growth shifts to areas of the world where education levels don't match America's.

There are a few worrying trends. The massive debt that the U.S. has piled up during the current economic crisis and the lavish new entitlement programs that Washington is considering could drive taxes much higher, depressing economic growth and potentially sending fertility rates tumbling. And a disturbing fact embedded in our high birthrate is that 35 percent of all American children are now born to single mothers—and the percentage is growing. Extensive research shows that children raised in single-parent households don't do as well in a range of areas, from school to work, and any sizable decrease in academic achievement or work-participation rates would erode the advantages of a growing working-age population.

Nevertheless, the United States faces a far less challenging task in maintaining its demographic balance in coming decades than most countries do. And the likely benefits of that stability will far outweigh many of the short-term economic concerns currently dominating headlines.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Steven Malanga. "Our Vanishing Ultimate Resource." City Journal vol 20, no. 1 (Winter, 2010).

City Journal is published by the Manhattan Institute, a think tank whose mission is to develop and disseminate new ideas that foster greater economic choice and individual responsibility.

THE AUTHOR

Steven Malanga is the senior editor of City Journal, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and a RealClearMarkets.com columnist. He writes about the intersection of urban economies, business communities, and public policy. Malanga holds an M.A. in English Literature and Language from the University of Maryland, where he worked for several years as a Master Teacher helping to oversee the university's writing program. He received his B.A. in English Literature and Language from St. Vincent's College in Latrobe, PA. He is the author of The New New Left.

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