Musings on the Seventh - Towards a Just Use of Freedom
I'm currently reading the supposed last book (Memory and Identity) published commercially by Pope John Paul II. As most people who are familiar with his "past life" before being elected as the 263th successor to St. Peter, Karol Wojtyla was a philosopher in his own right.
Some initial comments about the book:
1. This is a book similar to how Crossing the Threshold of Hope was drafted. A Q&A style, but this was more of a synthesis of what was discussed during a philosophers' conference he used to organize at Castel Gandolfo. The Q&A style in Memory was merely an editorial initiative (with the Q portion purely coming from the publishers, while the A part came from the late Pope himself, with the Q portion written way way after the A portion), instead of the originally planned interview by Vittorio Messori for Crossing.
2. Given that observation, I would advise purists of the "Karol thought" to avoid reading the Qs. I had this conclusion after reading a certain paragraph in one of the As. John Paul II referred to one of his great works as "The Acting Person" instead of "Person and Act", with the latter being a more faithful and direct translation of "Osoba y Czyn". Again, those familiar with the history would understand that The Acting Person is an imperfect translation, owing to the translator's phenomenological biases. (It's quite sad that it's the English version that had to have this perversion.) Reading further and recollecting on the other chapters already read, the actual question addressed in the Q parts had no direct logical flow from its "introductory" sentences, mostly filled with political polemic. Those who did not know the historical circumstances would have no idea why that question was asked in light of the earlier sentences. I personally found it a waste of words on such a beautiful tome.
The point here is that the actual written version of Memory must be taken with a grain of salt. Although I'm not yet done with the reading of Memory during this time of writing, I don't think the readers will lose anything by not reading the Qs. However, reading the A will reveal much of the Karol thought, which fans and serious philosophers will find very refreshing.
*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*
I've been struck by Chapter 7 of Memory. It's very powerful in spite of its brevity. Below is the abridged text of that chapter.
Chapter 7 - Towards a Just Use of Freedom
The fundamental question is: how can these possibilities of free decision best be used so as to avoid any future return of the evil at work in those systems and those ideologies?
If those societies sensed a new freedom after the collapse of the totalitarian systems, a fundamental new problem arose almost immediately -- the proper use of that freedom. The problem affects both individuals and societies: it therefore requires some kind of systematic solution. If I am free, I can make good or bad use of my freedom. If I use it well, I in my turn become more 'good' as a result, and the good I have accomplished has a positive influence on those around me. If on the other hand I use it wrongly, evil will take root and begin to spread both in me and around me. The danger of the situation in which we live today consists in the fact that we claim to prescind from the ethical dimension in our use of freedom -- that is, from consideration of moral good and evil. A certain concept of freedom, which has widespread support in public opinion at present, diverts attention from ethical responsibilities. Appeal is made today to freedom alone. It is often said: what matters is to be free, released from all constraint or limitation, so as to operate according to private judgment, which in reality is often pure caprice. This much is clear: such liberalism can only be described as primitive. Its influence, however, is potentially devastating.
We should add straight away that European traditions, especially those of the Enlightenment period, have recognized the need for a criterion to regulate the use of freedom. Yet the criterion adopted has been not so much that of the just good (bonum honestum) as that of utility or pleasure. Here we are faced with a most important element in the tradition of European thought, one to which we must now devote a little more attention.
In human action, the different spiritual faculties tend towards a synthesis in which the leading role is played by the will. The subject thus imprints his own rationality upon his actions. Human acts are free and, as such, they engage the responsibility of the subject. Man wants a particular good and he chooses it: he is consequently responsible for his choice.
Against the background of this vision of good, which is both metaphysical and anthropological, there arises a distinction of properly ethical character. It is the distinction between the just good (bonum honestum) , the useful good (bonum utile) and the pleasurable good (bonum delectabile). These three types of good are intimately bound up with human action. When he acts, man chooses a certain good, which becomes the goal of his action. If the subject chooses a bonum honestum, his goal is conformed to the very essence of the object of his action and is therefore a just goal. When on the other hand the object of his choice is a bonum utile, the goal is the advantage to be gained from it for the subject. The question of the morality of the action remains open: only when the action bringing the advantage is just and the means used are just, can the subject's goal also be said to be just. It is precisely on this issue that a rift begins to emerge between the Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical tradition and modern utilitarianism.
(to be continued ...)
Some initial comments about the book:
1. This is a book similar to how Crossing the Threshold of Hope was drafted. A Q&A style, but this was more of a synthesis of what was discussed during a philosophers' conference he used to organize at Castel Gandolfo. The Q&A style in Memory was merely an editorial initiative (with the Q portion purely coming from the publishers, while the A part came from the late Pope himself, with the Q portion written way way after the A portion), instead of the originally planned interview by Vittorio Messori for Crossing.
2. Given that observation, I would advise purists of the "Karol thought" to avoid reading the Qs. I had this conclusion after reading a certain paragraph in one of the As. John Paul II referred to one of his great works as "The Acting Person" instead of "Person and Act", with the latter being a more faithful and direct translation of "Osoba y Czyn". Again, those familiar with the history would understand that The Acting Person is an imperfect translation, owing to the translator's phenomenological biases. (It's quite sad that it's the English version that had to have this perversion.) Reading further and recollecting on the other chapters already read, the actual question addressed in the Q parts had no direct logical flow from its "introductory" sentences, mostly filled with political polemic. Those who did not know the historical circumstances would have no idea why that question was asked in light of the earlier sentences. I personally found it a waste of words on such a beautiful tome.
The point here is that the actual written version of Memory must be taken with a grain of salt. Although I'm not yet done with the reading of Memory during this time of writing, I don't think the readers will lose anything by not reading the Qs. However, reading the A will reveal much of the Karol thought, which fans and serious philosophers will find very refreshing.
*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*
I've been struck by Chapter 7 of Memory. It's very powerful in spite of its brevity. Below is the abridged text of that chapter.
Chapter 7 - Towards a Just Use of Freedom
The fundamental question is: how can these possibilities of free decision best be used so as to avoid any future return of the evil at work in those systems and those ideologies?
If those societies sensed a new freedom after the collapse of the totalitarian systems, a fundamental new problem arose almost immediately -- the proper use of that freedom. The problem affects both individuals and societies: it therefore requires some kind of systematic solution. If I am free, I can make good or bad use of my freedom. If I use it well, I in my turn become more 'good' as a result, and the good I have accomplished has a positive influence on those around me. If on the other hand I use it wrongly, evil will take root and begin to spread both in me and around me. The danger of the situation in which we live today consists in the fact that we claim to prescind from the ethical dimension in our use of freedom -- that is, from consideration of moral good and evil. A certain concept of freedom, which has widespread support in public opinion at present, diverts attention from ethical responsibilities. Appeal is made today to freedom alone. It is often said: what matters is to be free, released from all constraint or limitation, so as to operate according to private judgment, which in reality is often pure caprice. This much is clear: such liberalism can only be described as primitive. Its influence, however, is potentially devastating.
We should add straight away that European traditions, especially those of the Enlightenment period, have recognized the need for a criterion to regulate the use of freedom. Yet the criterion adopted has been not so much that of the just good (bonum honestum) as that of utility or pleasure. Here we are faced with a most important element in the tradition of European thought, one to which we must now devote a little more attention.
In human action, the different spiritual faculties tend towards a synthesis in which the leading role is played by the will. The subject thus imprints his own rationality upon his actions. Human acts are free and, as such, they engage the responsibility of the subject. Man wants a particular good and he chooses it: he is consequently responsible for his choice.
Against the background of this vision of good, which is both metaphysical and anthropological, there arises a distinction of properly ethical character. It is the distinction between the just good (bonum honestum) , the useful good (bonum utile) and the pleasurable good (bonum delectabile). These three types of good are intimately bound up with human action. When he acts, man chooses a certain good, which becomes the goal of his action. If the subject chooses a bonum honestum, his goal is conformed to the very essence of the object of his action and is therefore a just goal. When on the other hand the object of his choice is a bonum utile, the goal is the advantage to be gained from it for the subject. The question of the morality of the action remains open: only when the action bringing the advantage is just and the means used are just, can the subject's goal also be said to be just. It is precisely on this issue that a rift begins to emerge between the Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical tradition and modern utilitarianism.
(to be continued ...)
posted by Chipi Buenafe at
7:19 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home