Catholic Metanarrative

Friday, May 28, 2010

Excerpt: Consequences for Christian Involvement in Politics

Editor's note: In a way of celebrating the five years we've been online, Catholic Metanarrative presents an excerpt of a lecture prepared by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (Politische Vision und Praxis der Politik), which was delivered in Trent, Italy on September 2002. (The lecture can be read in full in the book "Values in a Time of Upheaval" published by Ignatius Press and Crossroad Publishing.)

I find it nice to refresh ourselves with the principles of how we can contribute to society, as many of the governments all around the world have experienced a change in its composition -- or have been threatened by anarchy and activism. Although the excerpt is just a small portion of the entire lecture, it does provide some points for us to ponder.

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What consequences may we infer from this for the connection between political vision and political praxis today? One might no doubt write an immensely long monograph on this topic, but I do not feel that that is my task. I would like to offer two theses, indicating as briefly as possible how the consequences of what I have written might be translated into action today.

1. Politics is the realm of reason -- not of a merely technological, calculating reason, but of moral reason, since the goal of the state, and hence the ultimate goal of all politics, has a moral nature, namely, peace and justice. This means that moral reason (or, perhaps better, the rational insight into what serves justice and peace, i.e., what is moral) must be activated ever anew and defended against anything that might lend obscurity and thus paralyze the capacity for moral insight. One-sided interests form alliances with power and generate myths in various forms that present themselves as the true path to the moral dimension in politics. But in reality, these are blind spots of those who exercise power -- and they make other people blind too.

In the twentieth century, we experienced the formation of two great myths with terrible consequences: racism, with its lying promise of salvation, propagated by National Socialism, and the divinization of revolution against the background of dialectical historical evolutionism. In both case, the primal moral insights of man into good and evil were dismissed. We were told that whatever served the superiority of the race, or anything that served to bring about the future world, was "good," even if the previous insights of mankind would have call it "bad."

After the disappearance of the great ideologies from the world stage, today's political myths are less clearly defined. But even now there exists mythical forms of genuine values that appear credible precisely because their starting point is these values. They are dangerous because they offer a one-sided version of these values in a way that can only be termed mythical. I would say that in people's general consciousness today, there are three dominant values that are presented in a mythical one-sidedness that puts moral reason at risk. There three are progress, science and freedom.

2. We are continually obliged to undertake new demythologizing in order that reason may truly come into its own. Yet here again is another myth that must be unmasked, one that confronts us with the ultimately decisive question of rational politics. In many cases, perhaps in virtually all cases, a majority decision is the "most rational" way to achieve common solutions. But the majority cannot be an ultimate principle, since there are values that no majority is entitled to annul. It can never be right to kill innocent persons, and no power can make this legitimate. Here too, what is ultimately at stake is the defense of reason. Reason -- that is, moral reason -- is above the majority. But how is it possible to discern these ultimate values that are the basis of all "rational" and morally correct politics and are therefor binding on every person, irrespective of how majorities may shift and change? What are these values?

Constitutional theory in classical antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and even in the conflicts of the modern period, has appealed to the natural law that can be known by "right reason" (ratio recta). Today, however, this "right reason" seems to have ceased delivering answers to our questions, and natural law is considered, no longer as accessible to the insight of all persons, but rather as a specifically Catholic doctrine. This signifies a crisis of political reason, which is a crisis of politics as such. It seems that all that exists today is partisan reason, no longer a reason common to all men, at least as far as the great fundamental structures of values are concerned. All who bear responsibility for peace and justice in the world -- and in the last analysis, that means all of us -- have the urgent task of working to overcome this state of affairs. This endeavor is by no means hopeless, since reason itself will always make its voice heard against the abuse of power and one-sided partisanship.

In my debate with the philosopher Arcais de Flores, we touched precisely on this point: the limitations of the principle of consensus. The philosopher could not deny that there exist values that even the majority must simply accept. But what are these values? Confronted with this problem, the moderator of the debate, Gad Lerner, asked, "Why not take the Ten Commandments as a criterion?" It is perfectly correct to point out that the Decalogue is not the private property of Christians or Jews: it is a sublime expression of moral reason, and as such it finds echoes in the wisdom of the other great cultures. To take the Ten Commandments as our criterion might be a tremendous help in healing reason so that "right reason" may once again get to work.

This also makes clear what faith can contribute to correct politics. Faith does not make reason superfluous, but it can contribute evidence of essential values. Through the experiment of a life of faith, these values acquire a credibility that also illuminates and heals reason. In the last century (as in every century), it was in fact the testimony of the martyrs that limited the excesses of power, thus making a decisive contribution to what we might call the convalescence of reason.

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