Towards a Just Use of Freedom, Part 2
(Continuing the Chapter 7 of Memory ...)
Utilitarianism ignores the first and fundamental dimension of good, that of the bonum honestum. Utilitarian anthropology and the ethic derived from it set out from the conviction that man tends essentially towards his own interest or that of the group to which he belongs. Ultimately, the aim of human action is personal or corporate advantage. As for the bonum delectabile, it is of course taken into account in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. The great exponents of this current of thought, in their ethical reflection, are fully aware that the accomplishment of a just good is always accompanied by an interior joy -- the joy of the good. In utilitarian thought, however, the dimension of good and the dimension of joy have been displaced by the search for advantage or pleasure. In this scheme, the bonum delectabile of Thomistic thought has been somehow emancipated, becoming both a good and an end in itself. In the utilitarian vision, man in acting seeks pleasure above all else, not the honestum. Admittedly, utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill emphasize that the goal is not simply pleasure at sense level: spiritual pleasures also come into play. They say that these too must be considered in making the so-called 'calculation of pleasures'. It is this 'normative' expression of the utilitarian ethic: the greatest happiness of the greatest number. All human action, individually and jointly, has to conform to this principle.
One response to the utilitarian ethic was offered by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The Konigsberg philosopher rightly observed that giving priority to pleasure in the analysis of human action is dangerous and threatens the very essence of morality. In this aprioristic vision of reality, Kant places two things in question, namely pleasure and expediency. Yet he does not return to the tradition of the bonum honestum. Instead he bases all human morality on aprioristic forms of the practical intellect, which have imperative character. Essential for morals is the categorical imperative which, for Kant, is expressed in the following formula: 'Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a universal law'.
Then there is a second form of categorical imperative, in which the person is given due priority in the moral order. This is the formulation: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end'. In this form, the end and the means reappear in Kant's ethical thought, but as secondary rather than primary categories. The primary category becomes the person. Kant could be said to have laid the foundations of modern personalist ethics. From the point of view of the development of ethical reflection, this is a very important step. The Neo-Thomists also took up the personalist principle, basing themselves on Saint Thomas' concept of the bonum honestum, bonum utile and bonum delectabile.
It is clear from this synthetic presentation that the question of the just use of freedom is closely linked with reflection on the topic of good and evil. It is a pressing question from both a practical and a theoretical point of view. If ethics is the branch of philosophy concerned with moral good and evil, then it has to draw its fundamental criterion of evaluation from the essential property of the human will, in other words, freedom. Man can do good or evil because his will is free, but also fallible. Whenever he makes a choice, he does so in the light of a criterion which may be objective goodness or it may be utilitarian advantage. With the ethics of the categorical imperative, Kant rightly emphasized the obligatory character of man's moral choices. At the same time, however, he distanced himself from the only truly objective criterion for those choices: he underlined the subjective obligation, but overlooked what lies at the foundation of morals, that is the bonum honestum. As for the bonum delectabile, in the sense in which it is understood by the Anglo-Saxon utilitarians, Kant essentially excluded it from the realm of morals.
The whole of the argument developed thus far concerning the theory of good and evil belongs to moral philosophy. Through these analyses of anthropological reality, various manifestations emerge of man's desire for Redemption, and confirmation is given of the need for a Redeemer if man is to attain salvation.
Utilitarianism ignores the first and fundamental dimension of good, that of the bonum honestum. Utilitarian anthropology and the ethic derived from it set out from the conviction that man tends essentially towards his own interest or that of the group to which he belongs. Ultimately, the aim of human action is personal or corporate advantage. As for the bonum delectabile, it is of course taken into account in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. The great exponents of this current of thought, in their ethical reflection, are fully aware that the accomplishment of a just good is always accompanied by an interior joy -- the joy of the good. In utilitarian thought, however, the dimension of good and the dimension of joy have been displaced by the search for advantage or pleasure. In this scheme, the bonum delectabile of Thomistic thought has been somehow emancipated, becoming both a good and an end in itself. In the utilitarian vision, man in acting seeks pleasure above all else, not the honestum. Admittedly, utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill emphasize that the goal is not simply pleasure at sense level: spiritual pleasures also come into play. They say that these too must be considered in making the so-called 'calculation of pleasures'. It is this 'normative' expression of the utilitarian ethic: the greatest happiness of the greatest number. All human action, individually and jointly, has to conform to this principle.
One response to the utilitarian ethic was offered by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The Konigsberg philosopher rightly observed that giving priority to pleasure in the analysis of human action is dangerous and threatens the very essence of morality. In this aprioristic vision of reality, Kant places two things in question, namely pleasure and expediency. Yet he does not return to the tradition of the bonum honestum. Instead he bases all human morality on aprioristic forms of the practical intellect, which have imperative character. Essential for morals is the categorical imperative which, for Kant, is expressed in the following formula: 'Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a universal law'.
Then there is a second form of categorical imperative, in which the person is given due priority in the moral order. This is the formulation: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end'. In this form, the end and the means reappear in Kant's ethical thought, but as secondary rather than primary categories. The primary category becomes the person. Kant could be said to have laid the foundations of modern personalist ethics. From the point of view of the development of ethical reflection, this is a very important step. The Neo-Thomists also took up the personalist principle, basing themselves on Saint Thomas' concept of the bonum honestum, bonum utile and bonum delectabile.
It is clear from this synthetic presentation that the question of the just use of freedom is closely linked with reflection on the topic of good and evil. It is a pressing question from both a practical and a theoretical point of view. If ethics is the branch of philosophy concerned with moral good and evil, then it has to draw its fundamental criterion of evaluation from the essential property of the human will, in other words, freedom. Man can do good or evil because his will is free, but also fallible. Whenever he makes a choice, he does so in the light of a criterion which may be objective goodness or it may be utilitarian advantage. With the ethics of the categorical imperative, Kant rightly emphasized the obligatory character of man's moral choices. At the same time, however, he distanced himself from the only truly objective criterion for those choices: he underlined the subjective obligation, but overlooked what lies at the foundation of morals, that is the bonum honestum. As for the bonum delectabile, in the sense in which it is understood by the Anglo-Saxon utilitarians, Kant essentially excluded it from the realm of morals.
The whole of the argument developed thus far concerning the theory of good and evil belongs to moral philosophy. Through these analyses of anthropological reality, various manifestations emerge of man's desire for Redemption, and confirmation is given of the need for a Redeemer if man is to attain salvation.
posted by Chipi Buenafe at
12:03 PM
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